Abstract
Introduction
The increasing complexity and interdisciplinarity of emerging Systems of Systems (SoS) -whose failure may cause injury or death to human beings-has resulted in a shift from document-based systems engineering to modelbased architecture frameworks. These frameworks manage system complexity, obtain system overview, encourage knowledge sharing, finding required system information, and enhance communication across disciplines and departments.
Additionally, the rising number of safety-critical SoS goes along with a shift to transparency and a rising need of the general public for safety.
In contrast, architecture frameworks in the systems engineering domain consider safety often as dependent attribute (A3AO, DoDAF, TOGAF) [1] , [2] , [3] , and put safety more in the background, which could result in an incomplete safety analysis causing an unsafe SoS. However, in software domain some frameworks have emerged that are primarily oriented on safety [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , but they are not specifically focusing on sharing architectural knowledge, which is an essential factor for conducting a safety analysis of a large, complex and interdisciplinary SoS. A suitable approach to conduct the safety analysis for a safety-critical SoS which has become popular recently, is the safety case approach. It conducts an argument for why the system is safe by means of claims, evidence, arguments and inference rules.
In order to deal with these challenges and impacts on performance and security which are also described by Chiprianov et al [8] this work attempts to redress the gap between the need to improve knowledge sharing during the establishment of a safety case and the missing centralization of safety in any architecture framework in the systems engineering domain.
For this purpose, we want to focus specifically on enhancing communication across disciplines by improving the interaction between stakeholders to shorten the development cycle in setting up a safety case. This increases the efficiency in safety engineering. For this purpose, we adjust the A3 architecture overview (A3AO) tool described by Borches [1] to make it applicable to safety cases. Studies show that this approach is well perceived by users and successfully applied in many practices [1, chapter 11] , [9] , [10] . It focusses on capturing and sharing architectural knowledge by making implicit knowledge explicit. In addition, in order to reach a large group of stakeholders, we use the systems modeling language (SysML) [11] , due to its increased use in industry.
In the first place, centralization of a safety case by allocating A3AOs to relevant meetings fosters focus and avoids idleness of stakeholders.
Second, modification of the A3AO tool by allocating functions extracted from safety standards to one of the three views, provides insight and facilitates safety information and results in a c communication tool that provides suppo safety complexity and safety overview.
Besides this, the derivation of requirem results in safety case-specific A3AOs acceptation and effectiveness of t framework.
Last, guidelines provide a consistenc architectural knowledge, making the fram and contributing to recognition of the A3A Given these points, if we compare t safety architecture framework (MBSAF) documents, the MBSAF captures and sha knowledge of a safety case in A3AOs increasing and effective interaction betwe more overview for managing safety co insight into finding required safety i therefore; an increasing efficiency in safety 2. Background
SoS under study
The SoS under study (here we refer to case) considers a Dutch railway safety-HSL-Zuid, which is a complex SoS project the subsystems: 1) transport; 2) s superstructure. The substructure contain regarding construction of paths, 1 subsys tunnel, and 1 subsystem regarding connect and new rails. The superstructure contain construction and maintenance of rails, transformer stations, communication, s tunnel facilities, emergency facilities, and includes multiple stakeholders who s contrary interests. The problems of this category: ill-structured problems [12] . It is to recommendations outlined in EN applications -specification and demonstrat availability, maintainability and safet applications) and EN50129 (railway communication, signaling and processing related electronic systems for signalin analysis used is a Functional Hazard Analy has as an effect that functions outlined standards are more of a functional n discussed in various meetings:
• Meeting on system definition: Function The HSL-Zuid safety case has b these functions, with a few adjustme • Function 2 is preceded by responsibilities of the stake components. With this in mind, the incapability with the number of views leads us overview (A3AO) tool. This appro of only three views visualized on o view (view of functions) , physical components), quantification view (k Next to these three views, the A3 of visual aids (small visualizations functions), constraints and choi information about constraints and c establish this overview), legend meanings of elements of that o information on the back of the A3-sh tional consequences:
termine individual risk e hazard rates: defining nal hazards: deliver ngency.
een set up according to ents: defining roles and holders for physical in the FHA, from which data model is shown in sessment of the barriers s.
of the HSL-Zuid w tool to provide guidance for n and what structure to ording to Zachman [13] . s continuous analyses as akeholders with various works can be of great y of stakeholders to cope s to the A3 architecture ach is based on the use one A3-sheet: functional view (view of physical key characteristics). AO tool also makes use to help understand the ices (notes that give choices that are made to (explanation about the overview), and textual heet.
Bow-tie approach
The proposed methodology for the functional view of one of is based on the bow-tie approach [14] , which gained popularity [15] , because of the simple overview of the different accident scenarios under analysis. A bow-tie diagram is represented by a top-event that can be considered as the accident, a list of potential threats on the left side of the top-event, and a list of the consequences on the right side of the top-event. It puts focus on the creation of barriers for discussing preventive (on the left-side) and corrective (on the right-side) elements.
Method
This study uses the well-known "Vee" process model, from which we use the methodology described by Blanchard and Fabrycky [16] . Requirements regarding the MBSAF are extracted from two sources: 1) Safety standards for architecting a complete safety case and; 2) Stakeholders for case-specific effectiveness.
At first, we extract functions from safety standards so that the goals of the three main views of the A3AO tool will be adjusted.
Hereafter, we perform a case study to derive requirements from various stakeholders. The participants consist of 9 stakeholders with backgrounds varying from safety engineers, domain experts and other stakeholders who were all involved in the process of the set-up of the safety case HSL-Zuid. The derived requirements are based on evaluations of stakeholders regarding interaction improvement by various diagrams that are set up during this study and finishes with 4 user-validations of the MBSAF.
Results

Allocation to meetings
It is important to make a clear distinction between the meetings because of the order of sequence in which the safety case must be established: defining the SoS of interest to analyze hazards in order to reduce risks.
For this reason, the MBSAF will consist of 3 A3AOs, two of which are safety related, see Figure 2 . These A3AOs must match the content of meetings (see section 2.1) to maintain focus. The overview on system descriptions has already been researched by Borches. This study only addresses the overview on hazard analysis and risk reduction.
Figure 2. Allocation of A3AOs to meetings
Next step is to modify the A3AO tool so that these functions can be fulfilled. For this, we use the HSL-Zuid as a basis.
HSL-Zuid A3AO hazard analysis
Function 2 and function 3 of the A3AO on hazard analysis contain functions, failure conditions and failure effects (also stated in Figure 1 ) making them automatically part of the functional view. For the HSL-Zuid, we start with a functional block diagram (FBD), because it can list functions, provide time-sequence and gives the possibility to include details on the interfaces between functions. A distinction between desired flow (normal scenario) and hazardous flow (failure scenario) is desirable as we want to indicate a hazard. To clarify the connections between function, flows and hazards, we include the FBD with flows, which results in a functional flow block diagram (FFBD) which also gives the possibility to cover function 3. Function 4 and function 5 are key parameters that are indicated by numbers or classifications, which means they must be part of the quantification view. For the HSL-Zuid, we choose a matrix to list the risks and THRs. Figure 3 shows the 4 functions of the A3AO on hazard analysis of the safety case of the HSL-Zuid with the allocation to views. Figure 3 also shows the A3AO on risk reduction only covers function 6. This function contains barriers for prevention or correction. These barriers are tailored to the identified functional hazards from function 2, which is shown as a feedback loop in Figure 3 . Next to function 2, function 6 also needs input from function 5, to determine which functions must be included or excluded. For the HSL-Zuid, we use a bow-tie diagram as a functional view, because it can list functions, failed functions, causes and consequences, and preventive and corrective barriers, but especially because it puts focus on creation of barriers instead of identifying hazards (as was the case with the FFBD).
HSL-Zuid A3AO risk reduction
HSL-Zuid Stakeholder requirements
This study also addresses the design of the diagrams, views, and total A3AOs of the HSL-Zuid by implementation of user-centered requirements. These set out the need of all potential users by derivation of requirements from stakeholders through iterations of the A3AOs. These requirements enhance effectiveness and acceptation. According to Rajabalinejad [17] , realization of stakeholders' values and their ranking can be a challenging task due to a high number of stakeholders and their competing or conflicting interest. This means that these requirements are not only case-specific, but also participant-specific. The requirements are shown in Table  1 . Stakeholder requirement #1 is covered by making use of visual aids that give extra information about the preconditions of the first-and last function.
Stakeholder requirement #2 indicates a need to get insight into the physical breakdown of the system to determine the relations between components to get insight into the responsibility of stakeholders. For the HSL-Zuid, we use a physical block diagram (PBD) to show relationships between components.
In early stages of this study, we found out that a stakeholder loses attention whenever it is not clear if the relevant hazard is under his/her responsibility, which is defined in stakeholder requirement #3. For both functional views of the MBSAF of the HSL-Zuid, this can be achieved by making use of swimlanes, which are vertical or horizontal bands in the diagram that divide the diagram into logical areas or partitions, and -for the HSL-Zuid-make it possible to group functions to its responsible component. For the physical view and quantification view we choose to include the blocks, tables and graphs with the names of the stakeholders.
Stakeholder requirement #4 about the SoS total current risk status can also be considered as a key parameter that can be included in the quantification view of both A3AOs. For the HSL-Zuid, we choose to present this in a table and graph.
Earlier, we stated the possibility of bow-tie diagrams to present barriers. This diagram also gives the possibility to cover stakeholder requirement #5, as the methodology provides a presentation for failed vs. broken barriers, but also to cover stakeholder requirement #6, as the methodology also provides a presentation for creation of barriers for discussing preventive (on the left-side) and corrective (on the right-side) elements. 
MBSAF
To capture the architectural knowledge of the HSL-Zuid, we set out guidelines, so that this MBSAF is reusable for similar safety cases.
At first, the 7 steps that are defined by Borches remain valid. These are: collect system concerns, create top level view, decompose top level view, quantify key parameters, complete A3 model, summary, share, adapt and store.
In contrast, these steps are no longer based on a system definition but on a safety case. This results in a change of goals and content of the three views in the A3AOs. The architectural knowledge of the A3AO on hazard analysis can be captured by: create functional view with identified functional hazards and functional consequences, and create quantification view with estimated risks and allocated THRs. The A3AO architectural knowledge on risk reduction can be captured by: create functional view with controlled hazards.
With this in mind, the basis for capturing the architectural knowledge for both A3AOs from which can be built on is shown by the two A3AOs in Figure 4 , which are used for the HSL-Zuid and can be seen as an example of the A3 model for safety cases.
Discussion
Centralization of hazard analysis or risk reduction fosters focus, but subsequently also means that the A3AOs are always depending on each other and cannot be set up separately.
Next to this, the functions that are used for allocation to one of the three views are extracted from a common safety method used in Railway domain, which may reflect domain dependency of this framework. Likewise, the diagrams we used for the three views of the HSL-Zuid also differ per case and per stakeholder making this framework less suitable for a large target group. Another factor that involves dependency is the fact that the predominant view on both overviews is the functional view. This is highly related to the nature of the safety analysis. A Functional Hazard Analysis is based -as the name suggests-on functional behavior. A safety analysis focusing more on physical behavior would likely result in another predominant view of the A3AOs.
Conclusions
Given the and the rising demands of the general public for safety, there is a need to demonstrate the safety level of the system by using the safety case approach.
Here, we propose a model-based safety architecture framework (MBSAF) that centralizes hazard analysis and risk reduction in separate overviews to foster focus and avoids idleness of stakeholders, moving away from subjects that must be discussed to fulfill the stated purpose of the meeting. This shortens the development cycle in safety case.
In comparison with traditional documents, it enhances collaboration and communication and provides support for managing system complexity and system overview.
Nevertheless, the extraction of functions from safety standards used in Railway domain entails domain dependability for this framework. Taking into account other safety analyses that can be used to develop a safety case would more likely result in a more generic MBSAF.
Next to domain-dependency, although user-requirements increase acceptation and effectiveness of the architecture framework, these requirements differ per safety case.
The MBSAF captures and shares architectural knowledge of a safety case in A3AOs which results in increasing and effective interaction between stakeholders, more overview for managing safety complexity, more insight into finding required safety information, and therefore; an increasing efficiency in safety engineering.
